ger imperial history it self-consciously engages with, I argue that Ben-Hur registers in its spectacular set pieces an abstract notion that is normally much harder to grasp: the ubiquity and invisibility of imperial ideology. What is more, I want to use Ben-Hur to raise some broader points about the place of the historical novel and historical analogy in the cultures of U.S. imperialism. The kind of popular romance that Wallace's novel in many ways exemplifies, conventionally excluded from accounts of the period's literary history, 3 ask us to look again at our tendency to define the modernity of the Gilded Age as a social and technological transformation or as a decisive turn to a twentieth-century world yet to come. If the novel is "one of the chief cultural means of legitimating imperial practices," 4 and if the specifically historical novel is, as Lukács claimed, a product of emerging national consciousness in historical terms, then how does Ben-Hur legitimate certain philosophies of (expansionist) nationalism in nineteenth-century America through an analogy that opens out to a deeper and longer sense of world-historical continuity?
The example of the Dewey Arch is instructive here because it welds those governing conceptual tropes of spectacle and imperialism to an iconography of ancient Rome.
It's an iconography that, as several commentators have pointed out, has an enduring presence in American cultural life, usually acting to either aggrandize American power or, conversely, serve as a ghostly mirror of future decline. 5 The final decades of the nineteenth century were no exception: the earnest and po-faced neoclassicism of public memorials and civic architecture during the period has been extensively commented on, but American cities were not short of more populist classical allusions as well. One could visit P.T. Barnum's Roman hippodrome at Madison Square Garden-running from the 1870s, it also toured the country and included live chariot racing 6 -or a production of choreographer and showman Imre Kiralfy's ninety-minute music and dance extravaganza, 'Nero, or, The Destruction of Rome'-a show which needed a stage nearly 500-feet wide.
(Kiralfy, incidentally, would later ask Wallace for the rights to build a thirty-acre Ben-Hur theme park on Staten Island, a request that Wallace refused.) 7 A commodified Rome, often reduced to an interchangeable set of clichés and stock images and suggesting something quite different from the emulation of classical republicanism found elsewhere in American neoclassicism, proved an enduring draw for a public partaking of commercialized mass culture for the first time.
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Perhaps primary among these host of Roman references, however, were those found at the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago. Daniel Burnham's "White City" employed the neoclassical flourishes of beaux-arts both to suture American identity into a history of republicanism but also to aesthetically (and politically) import the argue lies at the heart of Ben-Hur's display of the ancient world, the point is that we can usefully connect strategies of imperial power between very different contexts when it comes to the aesthetics of spectacle, and in this way begin to locate and name U.S. imperialism as something bound into conventions of (rather than existing as an exception to) Anglo-European empire.
Although it appears at a point some time before these material sites of Roman allusion, Ben-Hur inhabits (and, in fact, comes to exert pressure upon) the same symbolic be used to legitimize the political conditions of the present whilst also, as an artefact of print culture in its own right, circulating so widely and with such remarkable reach that it forms an exemplary lesson in the ideological power of popular culture. In a sense, I
read Ben-Hur in much the same way that Jesse Alemán and Shelly Streeby have contextualized a number of popular sensation fictions from the mid-nineteenth-century period:
as a narrative projection of the repressed knowledge of empire, a text that exemplifies in its investment in spectacle as well as in its spectacular success the way in which imperial ideology becomes hidden by its sheer ubiquity. 16 How the novel popularizes an imperial worldview tells us something important about the more general ways in which U.S.
imperialism was both naturalized and obscured in the cultural sphere.
Ben-Hur might also be recruited here, however conjectural that recruitment necessarily is, to illustrate the tendency of historical analogies to subsume the present Wallace to sell the rights) and ran unbroken until April 1920, by which point it had been performed over 6000 times (including tours to England and Australia) and seen by an estimated twenty million people. 21 Ben-Hur mania inspired a nationwide fraternal order that eventually became a multi-million dollar insurance company, and created one of the first truly mass-marketed examples of spin off merchandise-including bicycles, flour, a range of herbs and spices, coffee, household appliances, soap, and whisky. It was also the basis for two major film adaptations including William Wyler's record-breaking 1959 production starring Charlton Heston. 22 My interest in this essay is the original novel itself, but the story's enduring cross-media popularity indicates something about its narrative qualities that speak directly to the points I want to make. While some critics have noted how the novel goes to great lengths to imagine the reader as an embodied but always passive spectator, 23 I question just what political conditions this focalization is serving.
How does the novel's arrangement as a series of conspicuously theatrical episodes-a kind of spectacular method that has had much to do with its sustained appeal on stage and film 24 -mediate between the reader and the imperial politics of the time?
Central to my argument is the novel's framing plotline: the birth of Christ and of Christianity. In particular, the presentation of a religion's founding moment seeks to turn readers into the docile but always complicit spectators of Christianity's rise to moral and social hegemony, obscuring the sectional and theological differences of the Gilded Age by Whatever strident geopolitics or fascination for empire Wallace expressed elsewhere in his writing, it is clear that in Ben-Hur these beliefs are refracted through the story as the emergence of an eternal empire of righteousness; religion rather than statehood is the totality that will colonize the future.
Such is the cluster of ideas that Ben-Hur ponders around half way through the novel, when on hearing of the rising interest around the arrival of the King of the Jews he speculates in wonder about the brave new world that lies ahead:
The King implied a kingdom; He was to be a warrior glorious as David; a ruler wise and magnificent as Solomon; the kingdom was to be a power against which Rome was to dash itself to pieces. There was to be colossal war, and the agonies of death and birth-then peace, meaning, of course, Judean dominion for ever. 31 Violence is a necessary condition of peace, a demonstration of power capable of neutralizing opposition and installing conditions so universally desirable that any irruption of social disquiet can be forcefully rejected as a dangerous aberration. Furthermore, the possibility of this unquestionably utopian 'peace' is one only realizable in domains organized around political systems quite different from democratic republicanism-the monarchical-sounding "kingdom" or the imperially-figured "dominion." How this new order will reconcile the problem of its own imposition of power Ben-Hur himself contemplates, and his mentor Balthasar supplies the answer: the holy "Child Himself" will surmount the human frailty at the heart of empire because he will be "[o]n the earth, yet not of it-not for men, but for their souls" (262). The problem that confronts the kingdom of Christ in the novel is the same one found at the heart of American expansionism: how to be both exceptional and universal. As Stephenson argues, "conviction of the first allowed for belief that the United States could preserve its unique virtues only by remaining a society apart from a fallen world. Commitment to the second authorized a messianic activism by the United States to redeem that world." 32 "His goal was a Christianized world," LaFeber states, but it was to be one centered in the bounteous and relatively new spaces of the American west-the spaces, we should remember, where Wallace's political life had found its footing. 33 Like the publication of Ben-Hur, Strong is historically placed between two phases of U.S. imperialism and posits a natural continuity between them by combining a profound belief in religious destiny with an assumption of America's coming status as world power.
Ben-Hur doesn't simply imitate the imperial discourses of its own contemporary
context, however. It also draws a great deal of its presumptive energy from a longer historiographical sense of Christianity and empire, extending the frame of the novel's imperial logic not only back into a much deeper history but also into a transcontinental sense of empire that unsettles straightforwardly exceptionalist accounts of U.S. expan- 34 Here we find a classic account of Rome's decline, and one which tells the story in the same language of imperial destiny that Wallace would replicate a hundred years later: "a pure and humble religion," she writes, "the Pueblos were among the first to give allegiance to our government,"
and "now number not less than twenty thousand peaceful, contented citizens." 37 The "red race" have become happy American subjects, colorful additions with their "primi- as a Christmas special in 1886, and then two years later as a stand-alone volume), the face of Christ is again described as being "oval and delicate" topped with a "mass of projecting sunburnt blonde hair." 41 Wallace's Jesus is not only the centre of a religious identity crucial to imperial ideology, but is the racially (and therefore biologically) superior figure who promises an idealized future order freed from the atavism of the ancient world's heterogeneity.
America's imperial incorporation seeks (benevolently) to neutralize racial conflict, reconfiguring apparently "natural" differences into social cohesion. Ben-Hur absorbs this belief but does so in a way that begins to conflate both Roman and Christian civilization;
96 Studies in American Fiction "Rome prefigures Christian universalism" argues Kaplan, so that the latter ends up being a morally purified mirror image of the former. 42 At one point, the vast multicultural crowds gathering for the climactic chariot race give the narrator pause to ponder on the assimilating power of the Roman world: "Of the various missions of the great empire, one seems to have been the fusion of men and the introduction of strangers to each other"
(324). The reality of Roman imperialism-forced assimilation and subjugation-is here figured as a benign project, something akin to what Ben-Hur later sees as one of the primary benefits of Christ's founding of a new religious order: a "power ample enough to raise and support a Jewish crown over the wrecks of the Italian, more than ample to remodel society" is also, crucially, an ability to "convert mankind into one purified happy family" (473, emphasis in original). "Purification," as the term's long and queasy political history testifies, is very often not simply an eradication of immoral thoughts and acts, but a scouring clean of ethnic and racial multiplicity. The "fact" of Christ's whiteness sanctions the righteousness of the White Man's Burden, so that Ben-Hur again originates the teleological future of the U.S.'s imperial mission in a distant, pre-American, past.
The Imperial Gaze
While we can see how Ben-Hur foregrounds imperial spectacle in terms of its thematic preoccupations, there are, importantly, ways in which its investment in spectacle come to exert formal and stylistic pressures as well, and do so in a way that enable us to track for the historical novel, but it is also deeply marked with contemporary social meaning.
The sights of imperial Rome-invested in a covert declaration of unquestionable authority as they are-share in Ben-Hur an aesthetic and formal language with the spectacle of Christianity's founding, so that the two achieve a kind of narrative parity, antithetical in overt political terms but tacitly equated in their scopophilic power.
Ben-Hur stands today as something of a literary curiosity, largely unread even by academics and known better as a Hollywood blockbuster. It is also a novel whose once huge appeal seems unfathomable to most contemporary readers; an example, if nothing else, of the unbridgeable strangeness of historical tastes and fashions. Yet at the same time it yields something that feels strikingly at home amidst our concerns over American power, a cultural phenomenon bound up so intimately with a hawkish political scene that it seems to both record and participate not so much in an abstracted notion of foreign or domestic policy, but the social conditions within which policy must be ratified and enacted. In Ben-Hur the political and the aesthetic coincide in the form of the spectacle, narrativizing an uncanny pre-emption of popular culture's sometimes propagandistic role in America's more recent imperial misadventures.
Notes
My thanks to Anders Stephanson for his comments on an early version of this essay.
